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As the American Constitution approaches its 200th birthday-
its framers signed it on September 17, 1787-we are reminded once 
again of its striking vitality and longevity. It is by any standard the 
lively granddaddy of them all. And yet any birthday in the advanc-
ing years is in part a cause for taking stock and planning. Amid all 
the anniversary celebrations we will naturally wonder how well a 
constitution drafted in the eighteenth century performs in the twen-
tieth, and how well it will serve in the twenty-first. With the bicen-
tennial not far off, James Sundquist is (to the best of my knowledge) 
the first scholar of the American polity to address those sobering 
questions at book length. 
In the best of an old literary tradition, Sundquist's title 
promises considerably greater scope than the book delivers. It is 
not a book that addresses the full range of possible constitutional 
reforms, nor even the most popular proposals. Sundquist pays no 
attention, for instance, to the electoral college. Nor is there any 
reconsideration of the federal bargain or the structure of rights the 
document created. The book is entirely about the legislative and 
executive branches and especially the relations between them. The 
titles of the five central chapters are indicative: Forestalling Di-
vided Government, Lengthening Terms of Office, Reconstituting a 
Failed Government, Fostering lnterbranch Collaboration, and Al-
tering the Checks and Balances. In a word, the book is a reconsid-
eration of the constitutional separation of powers and an 
examination of proposals to alter it. The problem with the separa-
tion of powers is clear: 
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It is a truism ... that the power to prevent bad acts can also be employed to prevent 
good ones, however those two adjectives may be defined by any individual. The 
system of checks and balances that has been so secure a safeguard against tyranny 
has also given rise to the problem with which this book deals. For government to 
function effectively, the legislative and executive branches that are so well endowed 
with veto powers to thwart each other must somehow be induced to rise above their 
conflicting political ambitions and move in concert on essential matters. 
More generally, the entire structure of the separation of pow-
ers-replete with political conflict, overlapping powers, assorted 
checks and vetoes, overlapping terms of office, and fixed terms of 
office--does not provide the kind of unified, coordinated, and re-
sponsive government we need. The obsession of the framers with 
limiting power and authority produced institutions of government 
that do not provide effective government. Indeed the problem can 
very largely be summed up in three words: conflict, deadlock, and 
stalemate. And so Sundquist sets out to evaluate reforms advanced 
"on the assumption that the effectiveness of government can be im-
paired when the bargaining and rivalry between the executive and 
legislative branches degenerate, as they often do, into conflict and 
stalemate. The object must be to bring the branches to collaborate 
in greater harmony without subordinating either." 
After an opening chapter that outlines the problem and then 
two very useful chapters on the writing of the Constitution and the 
history of constitutional reform, Sundquist turns to his chief task, 
the consideration of reforms. The possibilities range from the banal 
to the bizarre, from minor palliatives to radical surgery. Should we 
make it impossible for the voter to split a ticket, to vote for one 
party's candidate for President and another's for Congress, or 
should we merely redesign the ballot (i.e., the fifty ballots) to facili-
tate straight-ticket voting? Should we lengthen the terms of office, 
especially for the House and the Presidency, and if we do, how do 
we mesh the lengthened terms for House, Senate, and President 
(e.g., 4-8-4 or 6-6-3)? How best to cope with the "failed" govern-
ment (read "failed Presidency")-most especially do we need some 
way of holding special elections before the end of a presidential 
term? (And how indeed do we call them, schedule them, and select 
candidates for them?) And how more specifically to modify the sep-
aration of powers-put Congressmen in the Cabinet, the Cabinet in 
the Congress, recreate the political parties as a grand bridge across 
the separation, give the President an item veto, strengthen the con-
gressional hand in the use of military force, resort to national refer-
enda on legislative or constitutional proposals? 
Sundquist always considers these and other proposals in their 
full context. He discusses the particular part or manifestation of the 
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central problem-conflict, deadlock, and stalemate-and then 
brings reform solutions to bear on the specific symptom or syn-
drome. Many of the proposals have histories (hearings before a 
congressional committee, for instance), and Sundquist sets them 
out. And everywhere he analyzes both the problem and the propo-
sal with impressive shrewdness. He understands the workings of 
the two branches, and the book is peppered with his insights into 
the likely consequences of any institutional reform. This grasp of 
the interaction of institutional structure and governmental perform-
ance is the book's greatest virtue. 
Sundquist's understanding, however, is pretty much that of the 
capital city and its insiders. It reflects a world preoccupied with the 
visible institutions of government and the most visible public offi-
cials. The central problem and the possible solutions are largely 
drawn in terms of Washington activity. The causes of deadlock 
thus are largely institutional, the result of all the sharing and coun-
tervailing of power the framers devised. It then follows logically 
that solutions will also be institutional. 
This institutional approach suffers from two basic flaws. First, 
it neglects the political and social causes of ineffective government. 
What of the roots that our governmental institutions have in demo-
cratic politics and participation? If one looks for the causes of con-
flict and deadlock, one can examine the lengthening of the nation's 
political agenda, the increasing role of active minorities in our poli-
tics, the proliferation of political groups and their representatives, 
the greater salience of issues (for some, even a single issue), the 
proliferation of political information carried to every part of the 
land. To be sure our eighteenth-century political institutions exac-
erbate the difficulties. But we have worked out problems within 
those institutions before, even within the most confining of them. 
We have after all achieved something very close to direct popular 
election of the President within an exceptionally unpromising insti-
tutional arrangement. 
It is within the last twenty-five years or so that we have added 
so much to the American political agenda: gender and ethnic 
equality, the environment, energy policy, abortion, an assortment of 
life-style issues, and immigration policies have all been added to our 
politics in that time. And it has been the last generation that has 
seen the explosion of group politics, whether one talks of powerful 
neighborhood associations, of political action committees, or of lob-
byists and "political representatives" in the country's capitals. In 
short it is the sharp rise in the politicization of at least part of the 
American electorate that marks our recent years and that certainly 
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has increased the demands and burdens on governments. At the 
same time we have witnessed twenty-five years of decline in the abil-
ity of the two major parties to organize the American electorate into 
cohesive aggregates. In short, Sundquist's crisis in effective govern-
ment is in considerable part a reflection of the remarkable changes 
and volatility in American politics since the 1950's. 
The fallacy of institutional autonomy carries over to Sund-
quist's discussion of reforms. They too have a rootless, even apoliti-
cal quality about them, curiously removed from the tides and 
passions of mass democratic politics. One may well want to think 
of special presidential elections to end the life of a "failed govern-
ment," for example, but quickly held presidential elections (with 
nominees chosen by some special process) fail to reckon with the 
consequences such an innovation would have for the parties, for 
electoral politics, even for the legitimacy of the presidency with the 
national public. Sundquist treats both the analysis of the problem 
and the consequences of proposed solutions almost entirely in "gov-
ernmental" terms. It is a view from the top that pays too little at-
tention to all of that political activity "down there." 
The second weakness of the institutional approach is that insti-
tutional reforms are exceedingly difficult to achieve. In a final and 
decidedly anti-climatic chapter Sundquist confronts the political re-
alities. The politics of reform are daunting, he admits. One needs 
very substantial majorities for most reforms (i.e., those that would 
require a constitutional amendment), and yet virtually all reforms 
would create political "losers," thereby generating the opposition 
that insures their own failure. As Sundquist notes, "If one institu-
tion or one political party or one ideological group gains, another 
loses. That, at bottom, is why there has not been a single amend-
ment in two hundred years that redistributed governmental power." 
In such circumstances reformers must search for packages 
with enough trade-oft's to assure, at least, that there are few losers. 
That, Sundquist acknowledges, is easier said than done, and after 
exploring those possibilities he faces the inevitable conclusion: 
All of the seemingly insurmountable obstacles to constitutional change could be 
overcome, of course, if the government were indeed to fail, palpably and for a sus· 
tained period. But the necessity to experience governmental failure, in order to 
prepare for it, is not a happy prospect. This book must end, then, on a pessimistic 
note. Nothing is likely to happen short of crisis-which is, of course, the case with 
all fundamental constitutional reform, in every country of the world and through-
out history. 
And so this survey of constitutional reform ends more with a 
whimper than a bang. 
Such dark reflections bring us abruptly back to reality. We 
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cannot avoid what is perhaps the most fundamental reality in the 
whole question of constitutional reform: the amendment clause. Its 
requirement of extraordinary majorities at each stage of decision 
has sharply limited both the number of amendments and their sub-
jects. As Sundquist points out, only two amendments have altered 
the institutions of government in close to 200 years: the seventeenth 
(direct election of senators) and the twenty-second (two terms for a 
President). (And only one since the Bill of Rights-the Income Tax 
Amendment-has directly altered the powers of any of the three 
branches.) We have, of course, achieved a degree of flexibility by 
relying on judicial interpretation of the Constitution. That avenue 
of change has worked well for recasting the meaning of terms like 
"equal protection," "commerce ... among the several states," and 
"freedom of speech." But even the most expansive judicial review 
cannot alter the Constitution's concrete institutional arrangements. 
There is no interpretational leeway in phrases such as "every second 
year" or "two-thirds of the Senators." 
Short of constitutional amendment, other forms of change can, 
as Sundquist acknowledges, meet the challenge of constitutional re-
form. Among political scientists the rediscovery of the political 
party has long been a favored nostrum. The parties have been po-
tent agents of fundamental change; for example they, more than 
anything else, turned the electoral college into a non-deliberating 
anachronism. Indeed, through much of American history the par-
ties provided the bridges (or some of the bridges) across the separa-
tion of powers. But their decline in the last several generations has 
become a part of the problem Sundquist addresses. When party at-
tachments and loyalties decline, voters more freely split their tickets 
and thus contribute to divided government. And at a time when 
candidates run their own campaigns for office with resources they 
raise, it is no wonder that parties in the Congress have increasing 
trouble getting the attention, not to mention the loyalty, of their 
members. The parties, in short, must be considered a part of the 
problem and not of the solution. 
Is the situation hopeless? The challenge of effective govern-
ment may indeed be too potent for us to meet while operating in 
some eighteenth-century institutions, but it is a little early to come 
to that conclusion. Congress has shown some capacity for devising 
new ways to organize governing majorities within the new politics; 
the legislative-executive commission that hammered out a bi-parti-
san, short-term "rescue" of the social security system may be one 
example. On the other hand, no new mechanisms may be neces-
sary. The surprising success of sweeping tax reform in both houses 
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of the Congress in 1985-86 may simply suggest that the members of 
Congress are devising new rules for "counting" majorities and 
maintaining electoral support in the new fragmented politics. 
Constitutional adaptation and flexibility-even informal 
change-is above all a question of the will and inventiveness of indi-
viduals. It is, quite simply, a matter of leadership. Men and women 
make government work, and they make constitutions work, too. By 
the same token, we are not apt to have much effective government 
with a President who does not like government, whether effective or 
not. Effective government in a democracy is at bottom a matter of 
organizing mass popular support behind public policy. For better 
or worse, American institutions of government are enormously re-
sponsive and sensitive to political opinion. That imperative tran-
scends even the institutional arrangements of the Constitution. 
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Few would deny that Laurence H. Tribe is one of the most 
sophisticated defenders of judicial activism writing today. This lit-
tle book is intended to convince the general reader that Ronald 
Reagan should not be allowed to place nominees of his choice on 
the Supreme Court without careful Senate inquiry into their views 
on contemporary constitutional issues. Fair enough. (Although 
one wonders whether Professor Tribe would be urging such vigi-
lance on the Senators if another administration were seeking doctri-
nal clones for Justice Brennan.) And Tribe develops an excellent 
case for close senatorial scrutiny of the "constitutional visions" of 
Supreme Court nominees. 
He begins by debunking the idea-which has wormed its way 
into the conventional wisdom of political scientists, historians, and 
other students of the Court over the past several decades-that 
Presidents cannot really do much to reshape the Supreme Court by 
nominating persons with views similar to their own. As Tribe effec-
tively demonstrates, this is, at best, a half-truth. 
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